



In the late 1950’s, Luce proposed two different theories of imperfect utility
discrimination that have had a lasting impact on economics. One model
(1956) gave rise to the literature on just noticeable differences while the
other (1959) laid the foundations for the literature on discrete choice. In
this paper, I present a unified model of imperfect utility discrimination that
generalizes Luce’s two models; and addresses the main limitations of each.
Surprisingly, choice behavior consistent with this model is characterized by
two conditions from Luce’s monograph (1959).
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During the late 50’s, Luce proposed two theories of decision-making that have had a profound
impact on economics: semi-orders (1956), which gave rise to the literature on “just noticeable
differences” and incomplete preferences; and the strict utility model2 (1959), which laid the
foundations for the multinomial logit model (McFadden, 1974) and the subsequent literature
on discrete choice.
While the literatures that developed from Luce’s two models have little in common, the
models themselves share the same basic goal: to capture imperfect utility discrimination.
In the semi-order model, the imperfection relates to the decision-maker’s inability to distin-
guish between alternatives whose utilities are close. In this sense, it is a theory of limited
discrimination. In contrast, the strict utility model is a theory of error-prone discrimination.
Since the decision-maker selects each alternative with odds proportional to its utility, she
becomes less likely to “mistakenly” choose an inferior alternative as its utility decreases.
1Université de Montréal and CIREQ. C-6018 Pavillon Lionel-Groulx, 3150 rue Jean-Brillant, Montréal
QC, Canada H3T 1N8. I am indebted to Bart Lipman, Tony Marley, Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Bill McCausland,
Doron Ravid, and Yves Sprumont for suggestions that have substantially improved the paper. I also thank
Max Amarante, Rosane Cebras, Itzhak Gilboa, Mathieu Marcoux, Paulo Natenzon, Colin Stewart, Gerelt
Tserenjigmid, Marie-Louise Vierø, Kemal Yildiz and Carlos at Whatever Art for their helpful comments; as
well as audiences at the 2017 Lisbon Meetings, RUD 2018, FUR 2018, University of Ottawa, and the 2018
CIREQ Workshop on Discrete Choice. Finally, I acknowledge financial support from the FRQSC.
2Luce (1959) does not use this name for his model. It is due to Block and Marschak (1960, pp. 179-180).
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Despite their impact, Luce’s two models are not without limitations. For one, the semi-
order model is agnostic about behavior on the small scale. When the decision-maker cannot
distinguish between the utilities of two alternatives, she is “indifferent” between the two
and the model is silent about how she chooses. In turn, the strict utility model is not so
convincing on the large scale. Even when the utility of one alternative is very small relative
to every other alternative, it continues to be chosen with positive probability.
In this paper, I propose a two-stage model of imperfect utility discrimination, called
the threshold Luce model, that not only unifies Luce’s two models, but also addresses the
main limitations of each. When faced with a set of alternatives, the decision-maker first
eliminates every feasible alternative that she clearly discriminates as inferior. Then, the
decision-maker selects each of the remaining alternatives (among which she discriminates
imperfectly) with probability proportional to its utility. On the small scale, the model
collapses to the strict utility model; and, on the large scale, to the semi-order model. What
is more, it unifies Luce’s two theories in a natural way: the semi-order that the decision-
maker uses to eliminate alternatives in the first stage is based on the utility function that
determines her choice probabilities in the second stage.
After presenting the model more formally in Section 1, I state my main result (Theorem 1)
in Section 2. Surprisingly, it shows that choice behavior consistent with the threshold model
is characterized by two conditions from Luce’s monograph (1959): the original version of his
well-known Choice axiom, which includes an “often ignored” (Luce, 2008) part pertaining
to alternatives that are chosen with zero probability; and a transitivity requirement that
weakens Block and Marschak’s (1960) Strong stochastic transitivity.
The result makes the threshold Luce model and the two conditions that characterize
it mutually reinforcing. In one direction, the fact that axioms from Luce’s monograph
characterize the threshold model suggest that it is the “right” way to unify his theories of
imperfect utility discrimination. In the other, the threshold model breathes new life into
Luce’s “old” conditions. When his monograph was first published, critics suggested that
Luce dealt with zero probabilities in a “distinctly artificial manner” (Luce and Suppes, p.
336). To the contrary, Theorem 1 shows that his original Choice axiom is essential for a
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natural model of imperfect utility discrimination. In the same vein, Theorem 1 provides
a fresh perspective on stochastic transitivity. It suggests that such conditions may play an
important role in decision-making procedures that combine a “coarse” process of elimination
with a more “refined” or deliberative process of choice.3
In Section 3, I present two additional results (Theorems 2 and 3) that are used to prove
my main result; and, in Section 4, I show how these preliminary results are relevant for
extensions of the model that vary the structure of the first stage and the level of connection
to the second stage. Not only does this serve to highlight the flexibility of my approach, but
it clarifies the connection between the original version of Luce’s Choice axiom and a growing
body of work that extends the strict utility model to accommodate zero-probability choice
(e.g., McCausland, 2009; Lindberg, 2012; Dogan and Yildiz, 2016; Ahumada and Ulku, 2017;
Echenique and Saito, 2017; and Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2018). Formally, the “gap” between
the Choice axiom and the extended Luce models studied in these papers is spanned by a
minor variation on Luce and Suppes’ (1965) Product rule.
1. The model
Let X denote a countable set of alternatives and F = {S ⊆ X : |S| ∈ N} the collection
of (finite) menus on X. A random choice function on F is a mapping p : X × F → [0, 1]
such that
∑
x∈S p(x, S) = 1 for every menu S ∈ F . In other words, p(x, S) is the probability
of choosing the feasible alternative x ∈ S; and, by extension, p(R, S) :=
∑
x∈R p(x, S) the
probability of choosing some alternative in the subset R ⊆ S.
My focus is a model of random choice that combines Luce’s models of imperfect utility
discrimination into a cohesive two-stage procedure. To formalize, first let R++ denote the
strictly positive real numbers and I++ the set of closed intervals on R++. Then, consider
3The only previous work to hint at this connection is Roberts (1971). Following Luce (1959, pp. 34-37),
he used probability thresholds to define a family of binary relations from binary stochastic choice data (i.e.,
for a given threshold, let x be preferred to y if the probability of choosing x over y exceeds the threshold).
Roberts then showed that a generalized version of Strong stochastic transitivity is necessary for a family of
semi-orders to be induced by the strict utility model in this way.
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the transitive and irreflexive (equivalently, transitive and asymmetric) binary relations4 
and > on I++ such that, for distinct intervals [a, b] and [c, d]:5
[a, b] [c, d] if a > d; and
[a, b] > [c, d] if a ≥ c and b ≥ d.
In words, [a, b] [c, d] if the interval [a, b] lies entirely above the interval [c, d]; and [a, b] >
[c, d] if each endpoint of [a, b] lies (weakly) above the corresponding endpoint of [c, d]. Finally,
define a utility function (on X) to be a mapping v : X → R++ that assigns a strictly positive
value v(x) to each alternative x ∈ X; and a utility correspondence (on X) to be a mapping
B : X → I++ that assigns an interval (or range) of utilities B(x) to each x ∈ X.
In the first stage of the procedure, the decision-maker assigns a range of utilities B(x)
to each alternative x in the feasible set S; and eliminates any alternative whose range lies
entirely below that of another feasible alternative. The set of remaining alternatives defines
a choice correspondence6 ΓB on F such that
ΓB(S) := {x ∈ S : B(z) B(x) for no z ∈ S} for each menu S ∈ F .
In the second stage, the decision-maker assigns a specific utility value v(x) to each of the
remaining alternatives; and uses these to determine the relative choice probabilities, selecting




What makes the procedure cohesive is the close connection between the utilities assigned
in the two stages. For each alternative, (i) the second-stage utility must be drawn from the
range of first-stage utilities; and, moreover, (ii) the two utilities must be co-monotonic.
Definition. A threshold Luce rule is a pair (B, v) consisting of a utility correspondence
B on X and a utility function v on X such that, for all x, y ∈ X: (i) v(x) ∈ B(x); and (ii)
B(x) > B(y) ⇐⇒ v(x) > v(y). The rule (B, v) represents a random choice function p if,
4For the benefit of unfamiliar reader, I define these properties in Appendix A.
5Since [a,∞) := {x ∈ R++ : x ≥ a} ∈ I++, I allow b, d ∈ R++ ∪ {∞} and define [a,∞] := [a,∞).
6A choice correspondence C on F selects a subset of alternatives ∅ ⊂ C(S) ⊆ S for each menu S ∈ F .
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if x ∈ ΓB(S)
0 otherwise.
The remarks below show how the model relates to Luce’s theories of utility discrimination.
Remark 1A. Luce (1956) defined a class of transitive and irreflexive binary relations that
accommodate intransitive indifference. Formally,  is a semi-order if it is irreflexive and,
for all x, y, z, w ∈ X, satisfies:
Ferrers property. [x  w and y  z] =⇒ [x  z or y  w]; and,
Semi-transitivity. [x  y and y  z] =⇒ [x  w or w  z].7
While both of these properties require  to be transitive, neither requires the indifference
relation ∼ to be transitive (where, as usual, one defines x ∼ y if x 6 y and y 6 x). Nonethe-
less, Luce showed that every semi-order  can be represented by a utility correspondence B
in the sense that for all x, y ∈ X,
x  y ⇐⇒ B(x) B(y).
Later work (e.g., Theorem 7 of Fishburn, 1985) tightened Luce’s result, showing that a
binary relation  is a semi-order if and only if it has a non-nested representation B in the
sense that for all x, y ∈ X,
B(x) \B(y) 6= ∅ =⇒ B(y) \B(x) 6= ∅.
Due to the close connection between the two stages of a threshold Luce rule (B, v), the
first-stage utility correspondence B is non-nested.8 So, the binary relation B defined by
x B y if B(x) B(y)
7Luce (1956) gives a more complicated axiomatization. The one here is due to Scott and Suppes (1958).
8In fact, requirements (i)-(ii) of the definition are equivalent to the requirements in Beja and Gilboa’s
(1992) generalized utility representation of semi-orders.
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is a semi-order. What is more, B rationalizes the first-stage choice correspondence ΓB.9
Remark 1B. Luce’s strict utility model (1959, p. 23) uses a utility function v to represent a





This is a special case of the threshold Luce model where no alternative is eliminated in
the first stage (i.e., ΓB(S) = S for all S ∈ F). One (B, v) parametrization with this feature
defines B(x) := [v(x),∞) for all x ∈ X (so that B(x) is bounded from below by v(x) and
unbounded from above).
2. Main result
In this section, I axiomatize the model and provide identification results for its parameters.
(a) Axiomatization
My characterization relies on two conditions from Luce’s monograph (1959). The first is his
main axiom (p. 6).
Luce Choice axiom (LCA). For all menus R, S, T ∈ F such that R ⊂ S ⊆ T :
p(R, T ) =
 p(R, S)× p(S, T ) if p(x, {x, y}) > 0 for all {x, y} ⊆ T ; andp(R \ {x}, T \ {x}) if p(x, {x, y}) = 0 for some {x, y} ⊆ T .
Conventionally, this axiom is stated in conjunction with the assumption that the random
choice function p is positive (i.e., p(x, T ) > 0 for each T ∈ F and every x ∈ T ). In that case,
it reduces to the requirement that, for all menus R, S, T ∈ F such that R ⊂ S ⊆ T ,
p(R, T ) = p(R, S)× p(S, T ). (LCA+)
9A binary relation  rationalizes a choice correspondence C if C(S) = {x ∈ S : z  x for no z ∈ S} for
all S ∈ F .
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This formula equates the probability of choosing in the menu R with the probability condi-
tional on any intermediate menu R ⊂ S ⊆ T . For a positive random choice function p, LCA+
is equivalent10 to the well-known Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), which speci-
fies that the odds of choosing x over y do not depend on the other alternatives available.11







Luce’s well-known Theorem 3 (1959, p. 23) shows that a positive random choice function p
has a strict utility representation if and only if p satisfies LCA+ (or, equivalently, IIA).
The original version of the Luce Choice axiom imposes the conditional probability formula
in LCA+ if binary choice probabilities discriminate “imperfectly” among the alternatives in
T . Otherwise, some feasible alternative x ∈ T is “perfectly” discriminated as inferior and
the second line applies, which stipulates that x can be eliminated without affecting the
probability of choosing within R ⊂ T .
The second axiom is Luce’s stochastic transitivity requirement (see pp. 27 and 143):
Luce transitivity (LT).12 For all alternatives x, y, z ∈ X such that p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z})≥1/2:
max{p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z})} = 1 =⇒ p(x, {x, z}) = 1.
This condition is less demanding than Block and Marschak’s (1960, p. 190) Strong stochastic
transitivity, which requires
p(x, {x, z}) ≥ max{p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z})}
even when max{p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z})} < 1. However, the two conditions are equivalent
when p satisfies the Luce Choice axiom (by Lemma 6 of Appendix E). In my setting, this
means that Luce transitivity is effectively more demanding than either of the Moderate or
10See Lemma 5 of Appendix E, which generalizes Lemma 3 of Luce (1959, p. 9).
11For an important critique of IIA, see Debreu (1960); or McFadden (1974), who adapts Debreu’s example.
12This axiom later appeared as Axiom 8 (Strong dominance transitivity) in Echenique and Saito.
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Weak stochastic transitivity conditions from the literature.13 Under the assumption that
p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z}) ≥ 1/2, the stronger of these conditions requires
p(x, {x, z}) ≥ min{p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z})}.
Theorem 1A. A random choice function p can be represented by a threshold Luce rule (B, v)
if and only if it satisfies the Luce Choice axiom and Luce transitivity.
As I show in Section 3, the two axioms play conceptually distinct roles in the representation:
the Luce Choice axiom ensures that p can be represented by a general two-stage procedure
while Luce transitivity ensures that the first stage of the procedure exhibits the required
structure and connection to the second stage. As I show in Section 4, the modularity of the
characterization makes it easier to generalize the result.
(b) Identification
The notions of “perfect” and “imperfect” discrimination (that I used to provide intuition for
the Luce Choice axiom) are related to parameter identification in the threshold Luce model.
To formalize these notions:
Definition. Alternatives x and y are imperfectly discriminated, which I denote x_y,
if both are chosen with positive probability from {x, y} so that p(x{x, y}), p(y{x, y}) > 0.
In turn, x and y are linked by imperfect discrimination if there is some some sequence of
alternatives z1, ..., zn ∈ X such that x=z1_..._zn=y. Since linking defines an equivalence
relation, it partitions the domain X into linked components.
The first-stage semi-order B (see Remark 1A) is identified by perfect discrimination:
x B y if p(y, {x, y}) = 0. (B-Id)
This is clear from the representation: to be chosen with zero probability, y must be eliminated
by x in the first stage. While the semi-order B may then be used to put bounds on the
13For the unfamiliar reader, I restate all three of these transitivity conditions in Appendix A.
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size of the utility interval B(x) associated with each alternative x ∈ X, there is no way to
identify these intervals exactly.14
In turn, the second-stage utility v is identified by imperfect discrimination. As in the
strict utility model, the relative utility v(x)/v(y) of imperfectly discriminated alternatives
x, y ∈ X is uniquely determined by the relative choice probability p(x, {x, y})/p(y, {x, y}).
By extension, the relative utility of alternatives linked by a sequence x=z1_..._zn=y of









However, there is no way to determine the relative utility of alternatives from different linked
components. To obtain relative identification of v across the entire domain, the following
condition is required:
Linked domain (LD).15 Every pair of alternatives x, y ∈ X is linked.
Luce (1959, p. 25) suggests that an even stronger regularity requirement (called Finitely
connected domain in Appendix A) is reasonable when the alternatives are distinguished by
“minor” differences.16 Whatever the merits of his argument, it is worth emphasizing that
Finitely connected domain and Linked domain both impose strong restrictions on the first
stage. In particular, they require B to satisfy the following property:
Sorites property. For all x, y ∈ X:
x  y =⇒ [x = z0 ∼ ... ∼ zn+1 = y for some z1, ..., zn ∈ X].17
This property formalizes the classical paradox of the same name: any pair of alternatives
14Where v is the (relative) utility determined by (v-Id), the lower end of B(x) must be between sup{v(y) :
y ∈ X and x B y} and inf{v(y) : y ∈ X and x 6B y}; and, the upper end of B(x) between sup{v(y) : y ∈
X and y 6B x} and inf{v(y) : y ∈ X and y B x}. See Definition 2 of Luce (1956) for a similar approach.
15This axiom previously appeared as Condition 4 in Krantz et al. (1989, p. 417) and Axiom 6 (Richness)
in Echenique and Saito (2018). Given the Luce Choice axiom, it is equivalent to a weaker condition that
allows for linking on non-binary menus.
16For a random choice function that satisfies the Luce Choice axiom and Luce transitivity, it turns out
that Linked domain is actually equivalent to this condition. See Lemma 7 of Appendix E.
17Recall that z ∼ z′ if z 6 z′ and z′ 6 z (see Remark 1A).
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that are perfectly discriminated (such as a “heap of sand” and a “non-heap of sand”) can
nonetheless be linked by imperfect discrimination. This property is quite limiting since it
precludes the possibility that ∼B is transitive.
The next result summarizes the foregoing observations about identification.
Theorem 1B. For a threshold Luce representation (B, v) of a random choice function p:
(i) the semi-order B is uniquely identified; and,
(ii) the utility function v is identified, within each linked component, up to a constant factor.
Accordingly, v is unique up to a constant factor if and only if the random choice function p
satisfies Linked domain. In that case, the semi-order B satisfies the Sorites property.
In combination with Theorem 1A, this clarifies the connection to a result from Luce’s
monograph (p. 25) that is often overlooked.
Remark 2. Luce’s Theorem 4 (which is restated in Appendix A) establishes a strict utility
representation for the domain of undiscriminated menus F+ := {S ∈ F : x_y for all x, y ∈
S} where all binary choice probabilities are non-zero. Specifically, if p satisfies the axioms
of Theorem 1A as well as the Finitely connected domain condition discussed above, then
there is a utility function v (unique up to a constant factor) that represents p on F+. Luce’s
result follows from Theorems 1A-B by noting that, in the threshold model, no alternative in
an undiscriminated menu is eliminated in the first stage (i.e., ΓB(S) = S for all S ∈ F+).
3. Preliminary results
In this section, I present two results that I use to establish the sufficiency of the axioms in
Theorem 1A. These results are interesting in their own right; and central to the extensions
discussed in Section 4 below.
(a) Extended Luce rules
To establish sufficiency in Theorem 1A, the first step is to show that the Luce Choice axiom
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is “almost” sufficient to obtain the following general two-stage representation of behavior:
Definition. An extended Luce rule (Γ, v) is a pair consisting of: a choice correspondence
Γ on F ; and a utility function v on X. The rule (Γ, v) represents a random choice function





if x ∈ Γ(S)
0 otherwise.
To simplify, I write (, v) instead of (Γ, v) when Γ is rationalized by a binary relation .
As noted in the introduction, this kind of representation has been studied in a number of
recent papers. Compared with the threshold model, it imposes less structure on the first stage
and does not require any kind of connection between the two stages of the representation. As
it turns out, the gap between the Luce Choice axiom and an extended Luce representation
is spanned by the following condition:
Quadruple Product rule (4-PR). For all distinct alternatives x, y, z, w ∈ X such that
x_y_z_w_x:
p(x, {x, y})× p(y, {y, z})× p(z, {z, w})× p(w, {w, x})
p(y, {x, y})× p(z, {y, z})× p(w, {z, w})× p(x, {w, x})
= 1.
To interpret this condition, suppose the decision-maker chooses exactly once from each of
the four menus in the formula above. Then, one can use her behavior to reveal preference
in the conventional way (i.e., aPb if a is chosen from {a, b}). Assuming that her choices
are independent across menus, the numerator of the formula reflects the probability of the
revealed preference cycle xPyPzPwPx. In turn, the denominator reflects the probability
of the “opposite” cycle xPwPzPyPx. In other words, the Quadruple Product rule specifies
that four-cycles of revealed preference are equally likely to arise in either direction.
This interpretation dates back to Luce (1959, p. 17), who showed that his Choice axiom
implies a similar condition for three alternatives.18 This condition, later called the Product
18For the proof, see Step 4 in the proof of Theorem 2 from Appendix C. To see that the Luce Choice
axiom does not imply the Quadruple product rule, see Example 2 in Appendix E.
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rule by Luce and Suppes (1965, p. 341), stipulates that, for every three-cycle of imperfect
discriminations x_y_z_x,
p(x, {x, y})× p(y, {y, z})× p(z, {z, x})
p(y, {x, y})× p(z, {y, z})× p(x, {z, x})
= 1.
It turns out that both product rules are necessary to identify utilities from choice proba-
bilities. To see this, suppose that p violates the Quadruple Product rule on the four-cycle of





p(x, {x, y})× p(y, {y, z})
p(y, {x, y})× p(z, {y, z})
6= p(x, {x,w})× p(w, {w, z})





To see that the Product rule is also necessary, substitute w = x in the preceding argument.
More broadly, the same kind of argument shows that a “general” product rule covering
cycles of arbitrary length is necessary for an extended Luce representation. The next result
follows from the fact that this general condition (called the Strong Product rule in Appendix
A) is implied by the combination of the Luce Choice axiom and the Quadruple Product rule.
Theorem 2. For a random choice function p, the following are equivalent:
(i) p satisfies the Luce Choice axiom and the Quadruple Product rule;
(ii) p can be represented by an extended Luce rule (, v) where  is transitive and irreflexive;
(iii) p satisfies the Luce Choice axiom and can be represented by an extended Luce rule (Γ, v).
For (ii), the identification of the binary relation  and the utility function v are the same as
in Theorem 1B. For (iii), the choice correspondence Γ is uniquely identified, for all S ∈ F ,
by Γ(S) := {x ∈ S : p(x, S) > 0}.
The equivalence (i)⇔ (iii) shows that the Quadruple Product rule is necessary and sufficient
for an extended Luce representation when p satisfies the Luce Choice axiom. In turn, (i)⇒
(ii) shows that the “rationality” of the first-stage comes for free: when p satisfies the Luce
Choice axiom, the Quadruple Product rule ensures that Γ is rationalized by a transitive
and irreflexive binary relation. Finally, (ii) ⇒ (iii) shows that the Luce Choice axiom is
necessary to ensure the rationality of the first stage.
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(b) Utility-based semi-orders
Since the Luce Choice axiom and Luce transitivity imply the Quadruple Product rule (by
Lemma 2(a) of Appendix D), Theorem 2 ensures that these axioms are sufficient for an
extended Luce representation.
To complete the sufficiency portion of Theorem 1A, it remains to show that the first and
second stages have the required structure. Given what can be identified from behavior (in
Theorem 1B), the relevant question is what conditions are necessary and sufficient for the
first-stage binary relation B and the second-stage utility function v to be related as in the
threshold Luce model.
Definition. A binary relation  is strongly based on a utility function v if there is a
utility correspondence B such that, for all x, y ∈ X: (i) v(x) ∈ B(x); and (ii) B(x) >
B(y) ⇐⇒ v(x) > v(y).19
The answer turns out to be the following “mixed” transitivity requirement.
v-transitivity. For all x, y, z ∈ X:
(i) [x  y and v(y) ≥ v(z)] =⇒ x  z; (ii) [v(x) ≥ v(y) and y  z] =⇒ x  z.
Besides the recent work on necessary and possible (NaP) preferences20 (see Giarlotta, 2018),
this kind of requirement has received little attention. To my knowledge, mixed transitivity
conditions have only figured prominently in work by Fishburn (1970, p. 321; 1985, p. 130),
Roberts (1971, p. 256), and Bordes (1979, p. 191).
With this in mind, it is worth considering v-transitivity in more detail. To do so, first
let Int(a, b) := {αa+ (1− α)b : α ∈ (0, 1)} denote the open interval with endpoints a, b ∈ R
(i.e., (a, b) or (b, a) depending on the relative size of a and b); and consider the following
19As discussed in Remark 1A, conditions (i) and (ii) ensure that the binary relation  is a semi-order.
20I thank Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti for pointing out the connection. Formally, an NaP preference
(%N ,%P ) is a pair of binary relations on X such that: (i) %N is transitive and reflexive; (ii) %N refines %P ;
(iii) for all x, y ∈ X, x %N y or y %P x; and (iv) for all x, y, z ∈ X, [x %P y %N z or x %N y %P z] =⇒
x %P z. To see the relationship to Theorem 3 below, let ≥v denote the binary relation induced by a utility
function v; and % the binary relation defined from  by x % y if y 6 x. Then, whenever  is irreflexive and
satisfies v-transitivity, the pair (≥v,%) defines an NaP preference.
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properties of a binary relation:
Definition. For a given utility function v, the following properties of a binary relation 
apply to all x, y, z ∈ X:
v-consistency. x  y =⇒ v(x) > v(y).
v-transitive indifference. [x ∼ y ∼ z and v(y) /∈ Int(v(x), v(z))] =⇒ x ∼ z.
The first property requires  to be consistent with (the weak order defined by) the utility
function v. In turn, the second property requires the indifference x ∼ y ∼ z to be transitive
when the utility of the “middle” alternative y is not between the utilities of the “extreme”
alternatives x and z. Intuitively, this ensures that the indifference relation ∼ must exhibit
some degree of transitivity.
Next, consider the following refinements of a binary relation:
Definition. Given an irreflexive binary relation , consider the binary relations defined by:
x ∗ y if x  z ∼ y or x ∼ z  y for some alternative z ∈ X; and
x ∗∗ y if x ∗ y and y 6∗ x.
The binary relation ∗ refines the original binary relation  (i.e., for all x, y ∈ X, x ∗
y =⇒ x  y) by adding “indirect” preferences that arise via intermediate alternatives. It
also refines ∗∗, which removes the “ambiguous” comparisons from ∗. Finally, it is well-
known that ∗∗ refines the original relation  when the latter is transitive; and ∗∗ coincides
with ∗ when  is a semi-order (see Theorem 2 of Fishburn, 1985).
Theorem 3. For an irreflexive binary relation , the following statements are equivalent:
(i)  is (a semi-order that is) strongly based on the utility function v;
(ii)  satisfies v-transitivity;
(iii)  satisfies transitivity, v-consistency and v-transitive indifference; and
(iv) ∗ satisfies v-consistency.
The equivalence (i) ⇔ (ii) is the result anticipated above: v-transitivity is necessary and
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sufficient for  to be strongly based on v. In turn, statements (iii) and (iv) recast v-
transitivity in more familiar terms.21 First, (iii) shows that v-transitivity not only requires
 to be transitive and consistent with v, but also requires some degree of transitivity for
the indifference relation ∼. In turn, (iv) shows that v-transitivity is equivalent to a stronger
consistency requirement, namely that ∗ (a refinement of ) is consistent with v.
Using definitions (B-Id) and (v-Id) to “translate” from the deterministic setting of
preference and utility into the stochastic setting of random choice shows that Luce transitivity
is necessary for the v-transitivity of B. In fact, Luce transitivity is also sufficient for this
purpose (by the argument given in Lemma 4(a) of Appendix D). Combined with Theorems
2 and 3, this establishes the sufficiency portion of Theorem 1A.
4. Generalizations
Luce transitivity jointly determines (a) the structure of the first stage and (b) its connection
to the second. In this section, I relax this requirement and consider some natural generaliza-
tions of the threshold Luce model along these two dimensions. As with the original model,
Theorem 2 makes it straightforward to characterize these generalizations by translating the
desired deterministic properties into the stochastic setting.22
(a) Structure of the first stage
For the first stage to be rationalized by a semi-order, one must impose stochastic versions of
the Ferrers property and semi-transitivity (defined in Remark 1B). In particular:
Stochastic Ferrers property. For all x, y, z, w ∈ X:
21For an irreflexive binary relation , v-transitivity is also equivalent to v-consistency and the following:
Roberts’ property. For all x, y, z ∈ X, [v(x) ≥ v(y) ≥ v(z) and x ∼ z] =⇒ x ∼ y ∼ z.
Roberts’ (1971, p. 250) notion of compatibility between a binary relation  and a utility function v requires
this same property but weakens v-consistency to the requirement that, for all x, y ∈ X, x  y =⇒ v(x) ≥
v(y). It follows that a binary relation  strongly based on v is compatible with v. To see that the converse
is not true, fix a linear order on X and let v denote the constant utility function (such that v(x) = v(y) for
all x, y ∈ X). Then,  is compatible with v but  violates v-transitivity.
22Fishburn (1978) exploited the same idea of translation, though his focus was a different model.
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p(w, {x,w}), p(z, {y, z}) = 0 =⇒ min{p(z, {x, z}), p(w, {y, w})} = 0.
Stochastic semi-transitivity. For all x, y, z, w ∈ X:
p(y, {x, y}), p(z, {y, z}) = 0 =⇒ min{p(w, {x,w}), p(z, {z, w})} = 0.
When combined with the Luce Choice axiom, these stochastic rationality conditions are
sufficient for an extended Luce representation (, v) where  is a semi-order. This fol-
lows from Theorem 2 and the observation that the Stochastic Ferrers property strengthens
the Quadruple Product rule when p satisfies the Luce Choice axiom. To see this, suppose
x_y_w_z_x. If both diagonal pairs are perfectly discriminated (x 6_w and y 6_z), then
the Stochastic Ferrers property also requires one of the adjacent pairs to be perfectly dis-
criminated (x 6_y, y 6_w, w 6_z, or z 6_x). So, suppose x_w. Since the Luce Choice axiom
implies the Product rule,
p(x, {x, y})× p(y, {y, w})





p(x, {x, z})× p(z, {z, w})
p(z, {x, z})× p(w, {z, w})
.
By re-arranging this identity, one obtains the formula from the Quadruple Product rule.
The same approach may be used to characterize extended Luce models that impose more
(or, in some cases, less) structure on the first stage.23 It suffices to translate the relevant
rationality conditions into the stochastic setting. For parsimony, I relegate the details to
Theorem 2∗ of the Online Appendix.
(b) Relationship to the second stage
The threshold Luce model imposes a tight connection between the two stages of the repre-
sentation. The next definition suggests some natural ways to weaken this connection.
Definition. A binary relation  is based on a utility function v if there is a utility cor-
respondence B such that: (i) for all x ∈ X, v(x) ∈ B(x); and, (ii’) for all x, y ∈ X,
B(x) > B(y) =⇒ v(x) > v(y). In turn,  is weakly based on v if there is a utility
correspondence B such that condition (i) holds.
23As above, one can dispense with the Quadruple Product rule when  satisfies the Ferrers property.
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A binary relation that is based on a utility function v may have less structure than one that
is strongly based on v. While the latter requires  to be a semi-order (see Remark 1A), this
is no longer true when co-monotonicity is weakened to condition (ii’).24 In turn, a binary
relation that is weakly based on a utility function v may be less closely related to v than one
that is based on v. The next example serves to illustrate:
Example 1. Consider the random choice function p on X := {x1, x2, x3} represented by
the pair (, v) where: x3 ∼ x2  x1 ∼ x3; and v(xi) = i for all xi ∈ X. Then, it is
straightforward to check that p satisfies the Stochastic Ferrers property and Stochastic semi-
transitivity. However, it violates Luce transitivity since
p(x3, {x2, x3}) = 3/5 and p(x2, {x1, x2}) = 1 but p(x3, {x1, x3}) = 3/4 < 1.
In this example, the issue is that the semi-order  puts alternative x2 “indirectly” above
alternative x3 while the utility function v does the opposite. In other words, the binary
relation ∗ (defined in Section 3(b) above) violates v-consistency. From Lemma 1, it follows
that  cannot be based on v. The utility correspondence B defined below shows that  is
nonetheless weakly based on v:
B(x2) := [3/2, 4], B(x3) := [1, 7/2], and B(x1) := [0, 5/4].
The next condition is the stochastic analog of the requirement that satisfies v-consistency:
Weak consistency (WC). For every sequence of imperfect discriminations z1_..._zn:






This condition states that, on a sequence linking perfectly discriminated alternatives, the
“net” odds cannot favor the inferior alternative. It is straightforward to show that, when
the Luce Choice axiom holds, Weak consistency strengthens Moderate stochastic transitivity
(see Lemma 3(a) of Appendix D).
24In this case,  is only required to be an interval order (see Appendix A for the definition).
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The choice function in Example 1 satisfies Weak consistency since p(x1, {x1, x2}) = 0 and
p(x3, {x1, x3})
p(x1, {x1, x3})







= 2 > 1.
More generally, Weak consistency is necessary and sufficient for the first stage to be weakly
based on the second. (The proof extends the arguments used in Theorems 1A and 3.)
Given the discussion in Section 4(a), one can then impose the desired structure on the
first stage by translating the relevant rationality conditions into the stochastic setting. For
extended Luce rules (, v) where the first-stage binary relation  is a semi-order that is
weakly based on the second-stage utility function v, for instance, it suffices to combine Weak
consistency with the Luce Choice axiom and the stochastic versions of the Ferrers and Semi-
transitivity properties.
Translating the requirement that v refines the binary relation ∗∗ from Section 3(b)
imposes a tighter connection between the two stages of the representation. In fact, this
Moderate consistency axiom is necessary and sufficient for the first stage to be based on the
second. As above, this result is a simple extension of Theorems 1A and 3.25 For parsimony,
I relegate the details to Theorem 1∗ of the Online Appendix.
5. Conclusion
To conclude, I briefly discuss some implications of my results for related work.
(a) Extended Luce rules
Theorems 1 and 2 are formally related to the recent literature on extended Luce rules.
The applications of Theorem 2 discussed in Section 4(a) cover many of the results from
this literature (see e.g., Theorems B-D in Appendix A). However, Theorem 2 cannot help to
axiomatize the entire class of extended Luce rules—since this result requires the first stage to
be rationalized by a (transitive and irreflexive) binary relation. Two recent papers (Ahumada
25An even stronger condition obtains by translating the requirement that v refines the binary relation ∗
defined in Section 3(b). From Theorem 3, this Strong consistency axiom is equivalent to Luce transitivity
when the Luce Choice axiom holds.
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and Ulku; Echenique and Saito) characterize the entire class of extended Luce rules in terms
of the Strong Product rule mentioned in Section 3(a) (see Theorem A in Appendix A). In
part, the value of Theorem 2 is to show that one can replace this requirement with the more
intuitive Luce Choice axiom in applications where the first stage is rational.
In turn, Theorem 1 generalizes the main result of Echenique and Saito (see Theorem E
in Appendix A), who characterize a special class of threshold Luce rules where the interval
around v(x) takes the form B(x) := [v(x)/
√
1 + α, v(x) ×
√
1 + α] for some constant α ∈
R+.26 Their result relies on the Strong Product rule and a “calibration” condition (Path
monotonicity in Appendix A) that strengthens Weak consistency.
(b) Zero-frequency choice
Discrete choice data almost always includes options that are never chosen. The phenomenon
has only become more prevalent with the advent of big data. Besides the work on extended
Luce rules, the threshold model is also related to some other recent work that address
“zeroes” in discrete choice.
Matejka and McKay (2015) propose a theoretical model that accommodates zero-probability
choice. In their model, the decision-maker has a prior over the utility of alternatives, which
she can update at a cost proportional to the reduction in entropy between her prior and
posterior beliefs. A different notion of attention costs motivates the threshold Luce model.
Instead of incurring information costs of refining her beliefs, the decision-maker incurs a
carrying cost for each alternative she considers. Based on her prior, she ignores alternatives
that are sufficiently unlikely to have the highest realized utility.
Gandhi et al. (2017) address some econometric issues associated with zero-frequency
choice. As they explain, the popular estimation procedure proposed by Berry et al. (1995)
does not work when the data contains zeroes. Typically, the literature has “ignored” the
problem by lumping zero-frequency choices with the outside option; or “corrected” it by
replacing zeroes with small choice probabilities. Both tricks introduce bias into the estima-
tion. Gandhi et al. suggest an approach that avoids bias by using the data to estimate
26Clearly, a binary relation  with such a representation is strongly based on the utility function v.
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upper and lower bounds for the true choice probabilities. Conceptually, this is similar to
identification in the threshold Luce model, which relies on choice data to determine ranges
of “true” utilities for each alternative.
(c) Luce’s conjecture
Luce (1959, pp. 27 and 112) conjectured that Luce transitivity is necessary to represent
a random choice function satisfying the Luce Choice axiom by a one-dimensional utility
scale. While he never explained the phrase in italics, the current paper suggests a number
of natural interpretations.
One such interpretation might require the first stage to be strongly based on the second
while another might only require the first stage to be weakly based on the second. Although
the conjecture is false under the second interpretation (by Example 1), it is true under the
first (by Theorem 1A). Considering that extended Luce representations were not known at
the time, this is remarkable. Even more remarkable, the first stage of the required repre-
sentation specifies a type of binary relation which Luce (1956) himself proposed only a few
years before making the conjecture.
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Appendix A – Background
(a) Representation of binary relations
Definition. The following properties of a binary relation  on X apply to all alternatives x, y, z, w ∈ X:
P1 (irreflexivity). x ∼ x.
P2 (transitivity). [x  y and y  z] =⇒ x  z.
P3 (Ferrers property). [x  w and y  z] =⇒ [x  z or y  w].
P4 (semi-transitivity). [x  y and y  z] =⇒ [x  w or w  z].
P5 (negative transitivity). x  z =⇒ [x  y or y  z].
A binary relation  is: a pre-order if it satisfies P1 and P2; an interval order if it satisfies P1 and P3; a semi-order
if it satisfies P1, P3 and P4; and a weak order if it satisfies P1 and P5.
Each of P3-P5 implies P2; and P5 implies both P3 and P4. So, a weak order is a semi-order which, in turn, is an
interval order. What is more,  is a weak order if and only if the indifference relation ∼ is transitive.
The following conditions impose some additional structure on the intervals used to represent a binary relation. As
in the main text, let B denote a utility correspondence and v a utility function.
Definition. The following regularity conditions for a pair (B, v) apply to all alternatives x, y, z ∈ X:
R1 (weak co-monotonicity). B(x) > B(y) =⇒ v(x) > v(y).
R2 (non-nestedness). B(x) \B(y) 6= ∅ =⇒ B(y) \B(x) 6= ∅.
R3 (clustering). [B(x) ∩B(z) 6= ∅ and B(y) ∩B(z) 6= ∅] =⇒ B(x) ∩B(y) 6= ∅.
A pair (B, v) represents a binary relation  if: (i) B represents ; and (i) v(x) ∈ B(X) for all x ∈ X. The next remark
(which adapts the results of Fishburn, 1985) ensures such a representation for the pre-order classes defined above.
Remark 3. Suppose  is an irreflexive relation on X. Then:
(a)  is an interval order if and only if it can be represented by a pair (B, v).
(b)  is a semi-order if and only if it can be represented by a pair (B, v) that satisfies R2.
(c)  is a weak order if and only if it can be represented by a pair (B, v) that satisfies R2 and R3.
In each of the statements (a)-(c), the pair (B, v) can be strengthened to a pair (B, v) that satisfies R1.
Proof. (a) Fishburn’s Theorems 6 and 8 establish that  is an interval order if and only if it can be represented
by a utility correspondence B. To complete the result, define v(x) := [inf B(x) + supB(x)]/2. Then, it is clear that
v(x) ∈ B(x) for all x ∈ X. What is more, (B, v) satisfies R1.
(b) Similarly, Fishburn’s Theorems 7 and 8 show that  is a semi-order if and only if it can be represented by a
utility correspondence B that satisfies R2. To complete the result, simply define v as in (a).
(c) Finally, part (b) establishes that  is a weak order only if it can be represented by a pair (B, v) that satisfies
R1 and R2. Clearly, R3 is also necessary for such a representation. Conversely, if the representation (B, v) satisfies R2
and R3, it follows directly that  is a weak order.
(b) Extended Luce rules
For the reader’s convenience, I state the main results from the related literature on extended Luce rules.27 Before doing
so, I first state some additional axioms mentioned in the text.
27To simplify the statement of these results, I omit the (obvious) uniqueness properties of the representation.
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(i) Axioms
Strong stochastic transitivity (SST). For all distinct alternatives x, y, z ∈ X:
p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z}) ≥ 1/2 =⇒ p(x, {x, z}) ≥ max{p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z})}.
Moderate stochastic transitivity (MST). For all distinct alternatives x, y, z ∈ X:
p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z}) ≥ 1/2 =⇒ p(x, {x, z}) ≥ min{p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z})}.
Weak stochastic transitivity (WST). For all distinct alternatives x, y, z ∈ X:
p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z}) ≥ 1/2 =⇒ p(x, {x, z}) ≥ 1/2.
Product rule (PR).28 For all distinct alternatives x, y, z ∈ X such that x_y_z_x:
p(x, {x, y})
p(y, {x, y})
× p(y, {y, z})
p(z, {y, z})
× p(z, {x, z})
p(x, {x, z})
= 1.
Finitely connected domain (FCD).29 For every pair of alternatives x, y ∈ X such that p(y, {x, y}) = 0, there
is a finite sequence of imperfect discriminations y = z1_..._zn = x such that max{p(zi, {zi, zi+1})}ni=1 ≤ 1/2.
For every menu S ∈ F , let S_ denote the binary relation defined by x S_y if p(x, S), p(y, S) > 0. Then, a (generalized)
sequence of imperfect discriminations is a pair (zi, Si)
n
i=1 consisting of: (i) a sequence z1, ..., zn ∈ X and (ii) a sequence
S1, ..., Sn−1 ∈ F such that z1
S1_z2...zn−1
Sn−1
_ zn. The pair (zi, Si)
n
i=1 is a cycle of imperfect discriminations if z1 = zn.









Luce’s Theorem 4. Suppose p satisfies LCA for {T ∈ F : |T | ≤ 3},31 as well as LT and FCD. Then, there is a




provided that (i) p(y, {y, z}) 6= 0, 1 for all y, z ∈ S and (ii) p satisfies LCA for the menu S.
Theorem A (Ahumada and Ulku; Echenique and Saito). Suppose X is finite. Then, p satisfies SPR if and only
if it can be represented by an extended Luce rule (Γ, v).
Maximization (Max).32 For all x ∈ S: p(x, S) > 0 ⇐⇒ p(x, {x, y}) > 0 for all y ∈ S.
Stochastic attention (SA).33 For all x ∈ S: p(x, S) = 0 =⇒ p(y, S) = p(y, S \ {x}) for all y ∈ S.
Theorem B (Ahumada and Ulku; Echenique and Saito).34 Suppose X is finite. Then, p satisfies SPR, Max
28Luce and Suppes (1965, p. 341) credit Luce (1959, Theorem 2) as the original source of this rule.
29In fact, Luce’s condition (Definition 1 on p. 25) imposes the stronger hypothesis that p(y, {x, y}) < 1/2.
30This axiom is called Extended Cyclical Independence by Ahumada and Ulku; and Cyclical Independence by
Echenique and Saito. The name used here instead evokes the connection to the Product rule.
31A random choice function p satisfies LCA for a collection G ⊆ F if it satisfies the axiom for each menu T ∈ G.
32This axiom (P1 in Fishburn, 1978) combines Echenique and Saito’s Axioms 2 (Weak Regularity) and 4 (Probabilistic
β).
33This is the stochastic analog of Masatlioglu et al.’s (2012) attention filter property (or Axiom 2 in Fishburn, 1975).
34Ahumada and Ulku replace Maximization with their Conditions 1-2.
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and SA if and only if it can be represented by an extended Luce rule (, v) where  is a pre-order.
Theorem C (Lindberg; Cerreia-Vioglio et al.; Dogan and Yildiz).35 Suppose X is finite. Then, p satisfies
LCA+ if and only if it can be represented by an extended Luce rule (, v) where  is a weak order.
McCausland considers the case where X ⊆ Rn+. In that setting, the (vector) dominance order  is defined by x  y if
xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ {1, ..., n} and x 6= y. Vector dominance suggests a natural concept of monotonicity:
Dominance monotonicity (DM). For all x, y ∈ X: x  y ⇐⇒ p(y, {x, y}) = 0.
Theorem D (McCausland).36,37 Suppose X ⊆ Rn+. Then, p satisfies LCA, MST and DM if and only if it can be
represented by an extended Luce rule (≥, v) such that, for all x, y ∈ X, x ≥ y =⇒ v(x) ≥ v(y).
A binary relation  is a multiplicative semi-order based on a utility function v if it can be represented by utility
correspondence B where, for all x ∈ X, B(x) := [v(x)/
√
1 + α, v(x)×
√
1 + α] for some constant α ∈ R+.
















Theorem E (Echenique and Saito). Suppose X is finite. Then, p satisfies SPR, Max, SA and PM if and only
if it can be represented by an extended Luce rule (, v) where  is a multiplicative semi-order based on v. In the
representation, v is unique up to a non-negative scalar if and only if p satisfies Linked domain.
Appendix B – Proof of Theorem 3
Note: For the reader’s convenience, I have underlined the key assumptions used to prove each step of Lemma 1. This
makes it easier to see how the arguments extend directly to establish Theorem 3∗ of the Online Appendix.
Lemma 1. If  is irreflexive and ∗ satisfies v-consistency, then  is a semi-order based on v.
Proof. Suppose  is irreflexive and ∗ satisfies v-consistency.
Step 1.  is a semi-order on X.
First, note that  is transitive. If x  y  z, then v(x) > v(y) > v(z) and, consequently, x % z by v-consistency. If
x ∼ z, then y  z ∼ x  y. So, y ∗ z ∗ y. Since ∗ satisfies v-consistency, v(y) > v(z) > v(y).
For P3, let x  y and z  w. By way of contradiction, suppose w % x and y % z. Since  is transitive,
y ∼ z  w ∼ x  y. So, y ∗ w ∗ y. Since ∗ satisfies v-consistency, v(y) > v(w) > v(y).
For P4, let x  y  z. By way of contradiction, suppose z % w % x. Since  is transitive, y  z ∼ w ∼ x  y. So,
y ∗ w ∗ y. Since ∗ satisfies v-consistency, v(y) > v(w) > v(y).
Following Fishburn (1985, pp. 21-23), first define the relations − and + on X by
x − y if x  z ∼ y for some z ∈ X; and
x + y if x ∼ z  y for some z ∈ X.
35Dogan and Yildiz replace LCA+ with an equivalent condition called rejection supermodularity.
36McCausland decomposes Dominance monotonicity into two separate conditions (his Assumptions 2 and 4).
37McCausland also imposes an additional condition (his Assumption 3) which ensures that v is log-concave.
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Step 2. − and + are weak orders on X.
Since  is an interval order on X (by Step 1), this follows from Fishburn’s Theorem 2 (1985, p. 22).
Let X− := {x− : x ∈ X} and X+ := {x+ : x ∈ X} and consider the relation ± on X± := X− ∪X+ defined by
x− ± y− if x − y or [x ∼− y and x + y];
x+ ± y+ if x + y or [x ∼+ y and x − y];
x− ± y+ if x  y; and
x+ ± y− if x % y.
Step 3.38 ± is a weak order on X±. What is more, x± ∼± y± ⇔ [x ∼− y, x ∼+ y and {x±, y±} ⊆ X−, X+].
To see that ± is irreflexive, suppose otherwise. In particular, let x− ± x−. (The case where x+ ± x+ is similar.)
Since x− ± x−, x − x or x + x. Both cases contradict Step 1 (i.e.,  is an interval order on X).
To see that ± is negatively transitive, suppose x± ± z± and consider some alternative y± ∈ X. By way of
contradiction, suppose y± %± x± and z± %± y±. There are eight different cases to consider:
1. (x±, y±, z±) = (x+, y+, z+). By definition, x+ ± z+, y+ %± x+ and z+ %± y+. So, x %+ z %+ y %+ x. Since
+ is a weak order by Step 2, x ∼+ z ∼+ y ∼+ x. By definition, x+ ± z+ and x ∼+ z imply x − z. So, x  w ∼ z
for some w ∈ X. If w % y, then x  w % y. Since  is transitive, x − y. Since y ∼+ x, this contradicts y+ %± x+.
Otherwise, y  w. Then, y  w ∼ z. So, y − z by definition. Since z ∼+ y, this contradicts z+ %± y+.
2. (x±, y±, z±) = (x−, y−, z−). By definition, x− ± z−, y− %± x− and z− %± y−. This case is similar to case 1.
3. (x±, y±, z±) = (x−, y−, z+). By definition, x  z, y− %± x− and z % y. Since  is transitive, x  z % y implies
x − y. In turn, x − y implies x− ± y−. But, this contradicts y− %± x−.
4. (x±, y±, z±) = (x−, y+, z−). By definition, x− ± z−, y % x and z  y. Since  is transitive, z  y % x implies
z − x. In turn, x− ± z− implies x %− z. But, this contradicts z − x by Step 2.
5. (x±, y±, z±) = (x+, y−, z−). By definition, x % z, y  x and z− %± y−. This case is similar to case 3.
6. (x±, y±, z±) = (x−, y+, z+). By definition, x  z, y % x and z+ %± y+. Since  is transitive, y % x  z implies
y + z. In turn, y + z implies y+ ± z+. But, this contradicts z+ %± y+.
7. (x±, y±, z±) = (x+, y−, z+). By definition, x+ ± z+, y  x and z % y. Since  is transitive, z % y  x implies
z + x. In turn, x+ ± z+ implies x %+ z. But, this contradicts z + x by Step 2.
8. (x±, y±, z±) = (x+, y+, z−). By definition, x % z, y+ %± x+, and z  y. This case is similar to case 6.
By definition of ±, x± ∼± y± if and only if [x ∼− y, x ∼+ y and {x±, y±} ⊆ X−, X+].
Next, let v denote the binary relation on X∗ := X± ∪X induced by v:
x∗ v y∗ if v(x) > v(y) and [{x∗, y∗} ⊆ X+, X or X−];
x± v y if x± = y+; and
x v y± if y± = x−.
In turn, extend ± from X± to X∗ := X± ∪X by letting x∗ ∼± y∗ if {x∗, y∗} ∩X 6= ∅.
Finally, let .v± denote the binary relation on X
∗ defined by the lexicographic composition of ± with v:
x± .v± y
± if x∗ ± y∗ or [x∗ ∼± y∗ and x∗ v y∗].
Step 4. .v± is acyclic.
38The proof follows the same kind of reasoning as the proof of Fishburn’s Theorem 3 (pp. 23-24).
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By way of contradiction, suppose .v± contains a cycle C on Y ⊆ X. Since ± is a weak order on X± and v is a weak
order on X, C contains a sub-cycle C ′ on Y ′ ⊆ Y that “alternates” two-by-two between Y ± and Y as follows:
...x+ .v± x v y .v± y− ± z+ .v± z...
Since .v± is a weak order on Y
±, r+ v± s− cannot hold for all r+ and s− in C ′ such that r+ .v± r v s .v± s−.
Without loss of generality, suppose y− %v± x
+. Since y− 6∼± x+ by Step 3, y− ± x+. So, y  x by definition. Since
 satisfies v-consistency, v(y) > v(x). Then, y v x by definition. But, this contradicts x v y.
By Step 4, the transitive closure tc(.v±) of .
v
± is a pre-order. So, tc(.
v
±) admits a weak order extension D
v
± by
the Szpilrajn Theorem. Since X is countable, Dv± also admits a utility representation u : X
± ∪ X → R such that
u(x) = v(x) for all x ∈ X. Finally, define B : X → I++ such that B(x) := [u(x−), u(x+)] for all x ∈ X.
Step 5. The pair (B, v) represents .
For all x ∈ X, v(x) ∈ B(x). For all x, y ∈ X: x  y ⇐⇒ x− v± y+ ⇐⇒ u(x−) > u(y+) ⇐⇒ B(x) B(y).
Step 6. The pair (B, v) satisfies R1.
Let B(x) > B(y). By way of contradiction, suppose v(y) ≥ v(x). By definition of B(x) > B(y), u(x+) ≥ u(y+)
and u(x−) ≥ u(y−) (with at least one of the equalities strict). Then, since v(y) ≥ v(x), x+ %± y+ and x− %± y−
(with at least one of the preferences strict). So, x+ ± y+ and x− ± y− by Step 3. Since (the asymmetric part of)
∗ satisfies v-consistency, v(x) > v(y). But, this contradicts v(y) ≥ v(x).
Step 7. The pair (B, v) satisfies R2.
Suppose u(x+) > u(y+). (The reasoning for u(x−) > u(y−)⇒ u(x+) > u(y+) is similar.) There are two cases:
1. If x+ ± y+, then: (i) x + y; or (ii) x ∼+ y and x − y. In sub-case (ii), x− v± y− holds by definition.
In sub-case (i), suppose y − x. Then, x ∼ z  y  w ∼ x for some z, w ∈ X. But, this contradicts the fact that
 is a semi-order. So, x %− y. Since x + y as well, x− v± y−.
2. If x+ ∼± y+ and v(x) > v(y), then x− ∼± y− by Step 3. Since v(x) > v(y) as well, x− v± y−.
So, x− v± y− in both cases. Then, u(x−) > u(y−) as required.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose  is irreflexive.
(i)⇒ (ii) Suppose  is a semi-order based on the utility function v. Given Remark 3 in Appendix A, there exists a
(B, v) representation of  that satisfies R1 and R2. Let x  y and v(y) ≥ v(z). (The case where v(x) ≥ v(y) and y  z
is similar.) Then, since (B, v) satisfies R2, B(y) > B(z), B(z) > B(y) or B(y) = B(z). Since v(y) ≥ v(z), R1 then
implies B(y) > B(z) or B(y) = B(z). Since (B, v) represents , x  y implies B(x) B(y). So, B(x) B(y) > B(z)
or B(x) B(y) = B(z). In either case, B(x) B(z) so that x  z.
(ii)⇒ (iii) Suppose  satisfies v-transitivity. To see that  satisfies v-consistency, let x  y. By way of contradic-
tion, suppose v(y) ≥ v(x). Then, x  x by v-transitivity, which is a contradiction. So, v(x) > v(y).
To see that  satisfies v-transitive indifference, let x ∼ y ∼ z and v(y) ≥ max{v(x), v(z)}. (The case where
v(y) ≤ min{v(x), v(z)} is similar.) Towards a contradiction, suppose x 6∼ z. If z  x, then y  x by v-transitivity,
which contradicts x ∼ y. Otherwise, x  z. By the same kind of reasoning, this leads to the contradiction y  z.
Finally, to see that  is transitive, let x  y  z. Then, v(y) > v(z) by v-consistency. So, x  z by v-transitivity.
(iii)⇒ (iv) Suppose  (is a pre-order that) satisfies v-consistency and v-transitive indifference. To see that ∗
satisfies v-consistency, let x  z ∼ y for some z ∈ X. (The case where x ∼ z  y for some z ∈ X is similar.) By way
of contradiction, suppose v(y) ≥ v(x). By v-consistency, x  z implies v(x) > v(z) so that v(y) ≥ v(x) > v(z). Since
x ∼ y ∼ z, v-transitive indifference then implies x ∼ z. But, this contradicts x  z.
(iv)⇒ (i) See Lemma 1.
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Appendix C – Proof of Theorem 2
Note: Given a sequence of imperfect discriminations (zi, Si)
n






(i)⇒ (ii) Suppose p satisfies LCA and 4-PR.
Note: The proofs of Steps 1 to 4 below do not rely on 4-PR.
Step 1.39 B is a pre-order where B is defined by x B y if p(x, {x, y}) = 0 (as in (B-Id) from the text).
To show that B is transitive, suppose x B y B z. By definition, p(y, {x, y}), p(z, {y, z}) = 0. So, p(x, {x, y, z}) =
p(x, {x, z}), p(x, {x, y}) by LCA(ii). Thus, 1 = p(x, {x, y}) = p(x, {x, y, z}) = p(x, {x, z}). So, x B z. Since B is
irreflexive by definition, the binary relation B is a pre-order.
Step 2.40 For all S ∈ F , Γ(S) = maxB S (where Γ is defined as in Theorem 2).
If |S| = 1, then there is nothing to prove. So, suppose |S| > 1. Starting from S0 := S, recursively define Si := Si−1 \{x}
where x ∈ Si−1 is such that y B x for some y ∈ Si−1.
To see that this iterative elimination process must stop at Ŝ := maxB S regardless of the order of elimination,
suppose that it stops at T ⊃ Ŝ. Then, there is some x ∈ T and y1 ∈ S \ T such that y1 B x and z 6B x for all z ∈ T .
So, y1 must have been eliminated at a prior stage by some y2 ∈ S such that y2 B y1. Since y1 B x, the transitivity of
B (see Step 1) implies y2 B x. Since the process stops at T , y2 ∈ S \T ; and one can then repeat the same argument
with y2 in place of y1. Since S is finite, this line of reasoning implies T = {x} and y B x for all y ∈ S \ {x}. This is a
contradiction: since |S| > 1 and T = {x}, there must be some stage where x eliminates an alternative y ∈ S \ {x}.
Since the elimination process stops at Ŝ, (the second line of) LCA implies p(x, Ŝ) = p(x, S) for all x ∈ Ŝ. To
complete the proof, suppose p(x, Ŝ) = 0 for some x ∈ Ŝ. Since p(Ŝ, Ŝ) = 1, Ŝ 6= {x}. Then, by (the first line of) LCA,
p(x, Ŝ) = p(x, {x, y}) × p({x, y}, Ŝ) for all y ∈ Ŝ \ {x}. Since p(x, Ŝ) = 0 and p(x, {x, y}) > 0, p({x, y}, Ŝ) = 0. So
1 = p(Ŝ, Ŝ) ≤
∑
y∈Ŝ\{x} p({x, y}, Ŝ) = 0, which is a contradiction.
Step 3.41 If x, y ∈ Γ(S), then p(x, {x, y})× p(y, S) = p(y, {x, y})× p(x, S).
From Step 2, p(z, S) = p(z,Γ(S)) > 0 for z ∈ {x, y}. By (the first line of) LCA, p(z, S) = p(z, {x, y})× p({x, y},Γ(S))
for z ∈ {x, y}. Since p({x, y},Γ(S)) > 0, cross-multiplying the identities for p(x, S) and p(y, S) gives the result.
Step 4.42 p satisfies the Product rule (PR) (which is defined in Appendix A above).




p(x,{x,z}) and Π := p(x, {x, y, z})× p(y, {x, y, z})× p(z, {x, y, z}). Then:
LHS ×Π = p(x, {x, y})× p(y, {x, y, z})
p(y, {x, y})
× p(y, {y, z})× p(z, {x, y, z})
p(z, {y, z})
× p(z, {x, z})× p(x, {x, y, z})
p(x, {x, z})
= Π.
by repeated application of the identity in Step 3. Since Π 6= 0 by Step 2, LHS = 1.
Step 5.43 p satisfies the Strong Product rule (SPR) (which is defined in Appendix A above).
Fix a cycle of imperfect discriminations (zi, Si)
n
i=1. By strong induction on n, I show that
P(zi, Si)ni=1 = 1. (∗∗)
The base cases n = 3, 4, 5 are straightforward:
39The argument establishing transitivity is equivalent to the argument in Luce’s Lemma 4 (p. 10).
40The last paragraph of the proof follows the argument in Luce’s Lemma 1 (p. 6).
41This result generalizes Luce’s Lemma 3 (p. 7); but the proof relies on the same type of argument.
42This result is Luce’s Theorem 2 (p. 16).
43This generalizes the argument for the same result in the strict utility model (see fn. 9 of Luce and Suppes, 1965).
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- n = 3: P(zi, Si)3i=1 = P(zi, {zi, zi+1})3i=1 = 1 where the first equality holds by Step 3; and the second equality by
the fact that the factors of P(zi, {zi, zi+1})3i=1 are reciprocals.
- n = 4: P(zi, Si)4i=1 = P(zi, {zi, zi+1})4i=1 = 1 where the equalities hold by Steps 3 and 4, respectively.
- n = 5: P(zi, Si)5i=1 = P(zi, {zi, zi+1})5i=1 = 1 where the equalities hold by Step 3 and 4-PR, respectively.
For the induction step, suppose (∗∗) holds for n ≤ m and let n = m+ 1.
By Step 3, (zi, {zi, zi+1})m+1i=1 is a cycle of imperfect discriminations. If p(zj , {zj , zk}) ∈ (0, 1) for some j ∈
{1, ..., ,m − 2} and k ∈ {j + 2, ...,m}, then zj_zk. One can use this link to divide (zi, {zi, zi+1})m+1i=1 into two new
cycles of imperfect discriminations, namely:
zj_..._zk_zj and zk_..._zm_z1_..._zj_zk
From the induction hypothesis,
P(zi, {zi, zi+1})k−1i=j ×
p(zk, {zj , zk})
p(zj , {zj , zk})
= 1 and P(zi, {zi, zi+1})m+1i=k × P(zi, {zi, zi+1})
j−1
i=1 ×
p(zj , {zj , zk})
p(zk, {zj , zk})
= 1.
Using Step 3 and these two identities,
P(zi, Si)m+1i=1 = P(zi, {zi, zi+1})
m+1
i=1 = P(zi, {zi, zi+1})
k−1
i=j × P(zi, {zi, zi+1})
m+1
i=k × P(zi, {zi, zi+1})
j−1
i=1 = 1.
To complete the proof, I show that p(zj , {zj , zk}) ∈ (0, 1) for some j ∈ {1, ..., ,m − 2} and k ∈ {j + 2, ...,m}. By way
of contradiction, suppose p(zj , {zj , zk}) ∈ {0, 1} for all j ∈ {1, ..., ,m− 2} and k ∈ {j + 2, ...,m}. (Since m+ 1 > 5, the
alternatives z1, z2, z3, z4 and zm are all distinct.)
Suppose p(z1, {z1, z3}) = 1. (The case where p(z1, {z1, z3}) = 0 is similar.) Then, z1 B z3. If p(z1, {z1, z4}) = 0,
then z4 B z1 so that z4 B z3 by transitivity, which contradicts the assumption that z3 ∼ z4 (i.e., z3_z4).44 So,
p(z1, {z1, z4}) = 1 (and hence z1 B z4). By the same reasoning, z1 B z4 implies p(z2, {z2, z4}) = 1 (and hence
z2 B z4). By pursuing this line of reasoning, one obtains the following:
p(z2, {z2, z4}) = 1⇒ p(z2, {z2, zm}) = 1⇒ p(z3, {z3, zm}) = 1⇒ p(z3, {z1, z3}) = 1.
Since p(z1, {z1, z3}) = 1 by assumption, the last implication above gives the desired contradiction.
Let
∗
_ denote the (symmetric) relation on X where x
∗
_y if x and y are linked. As noted in the text,
∗
_ defines an
equivalence relation on X. Thus, (X/
∗
_) := {Xj}j∈J partitions the domain X into linked components that are indexed
by some (potentially infinite) set J = {1, 2, ...} ⊆ N.
First, define a strictly increasing function f : J → [1,+∞) such that f(1) = 1. For each component Xj ∈ (X/
∗
_),
fix some x̂j ∈ Xj and set v(x̂j) := f(j). For each yj ∈ Xj \ {x̂j}, fix a sequence of imperfect discriminations (zi, Si)ni=1
from z1 = y
j to zn = x̂
j and set v(yj) := P(zi, Si)ni=1 × f(j). Since P(zi, Si)ni=1 is finite, v(yj) ∈ R++. So, by
construction, v is a mapping such that v : X → R++.
Step 6. p is represented by the extended Luce rule (Γ, v).
Fix some S ∈ F and x ∈ S. By Step 2, Γ(S) = maxB S. If x /∈ Γ(S), then p(x, S) = 0 as required. Otherwise,
x ∈ Γ(S). By definition, Γ(S) ⊆ Xj for some component Xj ∈ (X/
∗
_). By SPR,










× f(j) = p(y, S)× v(x)
44Given the definition of B , it turns out that ∼ coincides with _. Since the conceptual basis for each relation is
somewhat different, I continue to use both symbols (selecting the one that is more appropriate in the specific context).
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[p(x, S)× v(y)] =
∑
y∈Γ(S)




× v(x) = 1× v(x).





To conclude the proof, note that the uniqueness of B follows from Steps 1-2 above. In turn, SPR implies that v
is unique up to scalar multiplication within each linked component.
(ii)⇒ (iii) Suppose p is represented by an extended Luce rule (Γ, v) such that Γ rationalized by a pre-order .
From the uniqueness of the representation (shown above), p(y, {x, y}) = 0 if x  y; and Γ(S) = max S for all S ∈ F .
Applying these definitions to the representation, it is easy to check that p satisfies LCA.
(iii)⇒ (i) Suppose p is represented by an extended Luce rule (Γ, v) (whether or not p happens to satisfy LCA).
Using the representation, it is easy to check that p satisfies 4-PR.
Appendix D – Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 2. For a random choice function p that satisfies the Luce Choice axiom:
(a) p satisfies the Quadruple Product rule if it satisfies Luce transitivity; but (b) the converse need not hold.
Proof. Fix a random choice function p that satisfies LCA.
(a) Suppose x_y_z_w_x. I first show p(x, {x, z}) or p(y, {y, w}) ∈ (0, 1). Towards a contradiction, suppose
p(x, {x, z}) = p(y, {y, w}) = 1. (The case where p(x, {x, z}) = p(y, {y, w}) = 0 is similar.) If p(z, {z, w}) ∈ [1/2, 1],
then p(x, {x, z}) = 1 implies p(x, {x,w}) = 1 by LT, which contradicts w_x. So, p(z, {z, w}) ∈ [0, 1/2). Similarly,
p(y, {y, w}) = 1 and y_z imply p(w, {z, w}) ∈ [0, 1/2). So, p(z, {z, w}) + p(w, {z, w}) < 1, a contradiction.
By Step 4 in the proof of [(i)⇒ (ii) from] Theorem 2, LCA implies the Quadruple Product rule. Since p(x, {x, z})
or p(y, {y, w}) ∈ (0, 1), the argument in Section 4(a) then implies the required identity.
(b) Suppose p on X := {x, y, z, w} is represented by (, v) where: x  y and z  w (but a ∼ b for all other a, b ∈ X);
and v(a) = 1 for all a ∈ X. To see that p violates LT, notice that p(x, {x, y}) = 1 but p(x, {x, z}), p(y, {y, z}) = 1/2.
Lemma 3. For a random choice function p that satisfies the Luce Choice axiom:
(a) p satisfies Moderate stochastic transitivity if it satisfies Weak consistency; but (b) the converse need not hold.
Proof. Fix a random choice function p that satisfies LCA.
(a) First observe that LCA implies that p satisfies S2 and PR (by Steps 1 and 4 in the proof of Theorem 2). Next,
suppose min{p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z})} ≥ 1/2 for distinct x, y, z ∈ X. There are four cases:
1. Let p(x, {x, y}) = p(y, {y, z}) = 1. Then, by S2, p(x, {x, z}) = 1 = min{p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z})}.
2. Let p(x, {x, y}) = 1 and p(y, {y, z}) < 1. If p(x, {x, z}) = 0, then p(z, {y, z}) = 1 by S2, which contradicts
p(y, {y, z}) ≥ 1/2. If p(x, {x, z}) = 1, then p(x, {x, z}) > p(y, {y, z}) = min{p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z})} as required.
Otherwise, p(x, {x, z}) ∈ (0, 1). In that case,
p(y, {y, z})
p(z, {y, z})
× p(z, {x, z})
p(x, {x, z})
< 1
by WC. Since p(y, {y, z}) ≥ 1/2, it again follows that p(x, {x, z}) > p(y, {y, z}) = min{p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z})}.
3. Let p(x, {x, y}) < 1 and p(y, {y, z})} = 1. This case is similar to case 2.
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4. Let max{p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z})} < 1. If p(x, {x, z}) = 0, then p(z, {y, z}) > p(x, {x, y}) ≥ 1/2 by (the reasoning
in) case 2. But, this contradicts p(y, {y, z}) ≥ 1/2. If p(x, {x, z}) = 1, then p(x, {x, z}) ≥ min{p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z})}






× p(y, {y, z})
p(z, {y, z})
by PR. Then, since min{p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z})} ≥ 1/2, p(x, {x, z}) ≥ min{p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z})}.
(b) The random choice function p from the proof of Lemma 2(b) satisfies MST and LCA. However, it violates WC.
To see this, notice that p(y, {x, y}) = 0 and y_z_x but p(y, {y, z})× p(z, {x, z}) = p(z, {y, z})× p(x, {x, z}).
Lemma 4. For a random choice function p that satisfies the Luce Choice axiom:
(a) p satisfies Weak consistency if it satisfies Luce transitivity; but (b) the converse need not hold.
Proof. Fix a random choice function p that satisfies LCA.
(a) Since p satisfies LCA and LT, p satisfies 4-PR by Lemma 2(a). So, p satisfies SPR by Step 5 of Theorem 2.
Now, suppose y is linked to x by a sequence of imperfect discriminations (zi, {zi, zi+1})ni=1 and p(y, {x, y}) = 0. The
proof that P(zi, {zi, zi+1})ni=1 < 1 holds is by strong induction on n.
For the base case n = 3, y = z1_z2_z3 = x. If p(y, {y, z2}) ∈ [1/2, 1), then p(x, {x, z2}) = 1 by LT. So,
p(y, {y, z2}) < 1/2. Similarly, p(z2, {x, z2}) < 1/2. Combining these two inequalities gives P(zi, {zi, zi+1})3i=1 < 1.
For the induction step n = m+1, suppose the desired identity holds for every sequence of imperfect discriminations
(zi, {zi, zi+1})ni=1 such that n ≤ m. If p(zj , {zj , zk}) ∈ (0, 1) for any 1 ≤ j, k ≤ m + 1 such that k > j + 1, then
y = z1_..._zj_zk_..._zm+1 = x so that
P(zi, {zi, zi+1})ji=1 ×
p(zj , {zj , zk})
p(zk, {zj , zk})
× P(zi, {zi, zi+1})m+1i=k < 1
by the induction hypothesis. Since p satisfies SPR, p(zj , {zj , zk}) = P(zi, {zi, zi+1})ki=j × p(zk, {zj , zk}). By combining
this with the previous inequality,
P(zi, {zi, zi+1})m+1i=1 = P(zi, {zi, zi+1})
j
i=1 × P(zi, {zi, zi+1})
k
i=j × P(zi, {zi, zi+1})m+1i=k < 1.
So, suppose p(zj , {zj , zk}) ∈ {0, 1} for all 1 ≤ j, k ≤ m+ 1 such that k > j + 1.
In case p(z1, {z1, z3}) = 0, the base case n = 3 implies p(z1, {z1, z2}), p(z2, {z2, z3}) < 1/2. What is more,
p(z2, {z2, z4}) = 0. Otherwise, p(z2, {z2, z4}) = 1 which implies p(z2, {z2, z3}) > 1/2 by the base case n = 3. By
extending this type of reasoning, p(z1, {z1, z3}) = 0 implies p(zi, {zi, zi+1}) < 1/2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Similarly,
p(z1, {z1, z3}) = 1 implies p(zi, {zi, zi+1}) > 1/2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Now, consider p(z1, {z1, zm}) ∈ {0, 1}. If p(y, {y, zm}) = 1, then p(x, {x, y}) = 1 and LT imply p(x, {x, zm}) = 1,
which contradicts p(x, {x, zm}) ∈ (0, 1). So, p(y, {y, zm}) = 0. Similarly, p(z2, {z2, x}) = 0. Since y = z1_..._zm and
z2_..._zm+1 = x, the induction hypothesis then implies P(zi, {zi, zi+1})mi=1 < 1 and P(zi, {zi, zi+1})
m+1
i=2 < 1.
Since p(z1, {z1, z3}) ∈ {0, 1}, the observations from the two previous paragraphs together imply p(zi, {zi, zi+1}) < 1/2
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Combining these m inequalities gives P(zi, {zi, zi+1})m+1i=1 < 1.
(b) The random choice function p from the example in Section 4(b) satisfies WC and LCA but violates LT.
Note: For the reader’s convenience, I have underlined the key assumptions used to prove each step of Theorem 1. This
makes it easier to see how the arguments extend directly to establish Theorem 1∗ of the Online Appendix.
Proof of Theorem 1. (A) (⇐) Suppose p satisfies LCA and LT.
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Since it satisfies LCA and LT, p satisfies Weak consistency (WC) and Weak stochastic transitivity (WST) by Lemmas
3(a) and 4(a). Let p denote the binary relation on X defined by x p y if p(y, {x, y}) < 1/2. By WST, p is a weak
order. (It is irreflexive by definition. To that it is negatively transitive, let x p y. By way of contradiction, suppose
y %p z %p x. Then, y %p x by WST, which contradicts x p y.)
First, consider the equivalence relation
∗
_ defined after Step 5 of Theorem 2. By definition, the partition (X/
∗
_)
coarsens (X/∼p). Number the components of (X/
∗
_) in increasing order of p (i.e., recursively define X1 := X,
Xj+1 := X \ (∪jk=1Xk) and Xj ∈ (X/
∗
_) so that Xj ⊇ arg minp Xj contains the p-minimal alternatives in Xj).
Next, define the strictly increasing function f : J → [1,+∞) from the proof of Theorem 2 as follows:











i+1})ki=1 is a sequence of imperfect discriminations linking xj ∈ arg maxp Xj to xj ∈ arg minp Xj .
Define v : X → R++ as in the proof of Theorem 2 by picking x̂j ∈ arg minp Xj for each Xj ∈ (X/
∗
_).
Step 1. (B , v) represents p where B is defined as in (B-Id).
By Lemma 2(a), LCA and LT imply 4-PR. The result then follows from the proof of Theorem 2.
Step 2. B is a semi-order that is based on v.
Since p satisfies LCA and 4-PR, p satisfies SPR by Step 5 in the proof of Theorem 2.
By Theorem 3, it suffices to show that ∗B satisfies v-consistency. To see this, let x B z ∼B y for some z ∈ X.
(The case where x ∼B z B y for some z ∈ X is similar.) There are two possibilities.
If x ∈ Xj and y, z ∈ Xk for j 6= k, then k < j since x B z. By definition of v,
v(x) ≥ f(j) ≥ v(z) + 1 > v(y)
where z ∈ arg maxp Xk. So, v(x) > v(y) as required.
Otherwise, x, y, z ∈ Xj . First observe p(y, {x, y}) ∈ [0, 1/2). Otherwise, p(y, {x, y}) ∈ [1/2, 1]. Then, since
p(x, {x, z}) = 1, LT implies p(y, {y, z}) = 1. But, this contradicts y ∼B z. This leaves two possibilities:







_ wn = x̂







_ w′n = x̂
j . Then, since p satisfies WC and SPR,
1 >
P(w′i, {w′i, w′i+1})mi=1 × f(j)
P(wi, {wi, wi+1})ni=1 × f(j)
=
P(w′i, S′i)mi=1 × f(j)










P(w′i, S′i)mi=1 × f(j)





In either case, v(x) > v(y) as required.
(⇒) Suppose p is represented by a threshold Luce rule (B, v). Given Theorem 2, I show that p satisfies LT. Fix
x, y, z ∈ X such that p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z}) ∈ [1/2, 1]. Suppose p(x, {x, y}) = 1. (The case where p(y, {y, z}) = 1 is
similar.) If p(y, {y, z}) ∈ [1/2, 1), then v(y) > v(z). Then, since B satisfies v-transitivity (by Theorem 3), p(x, {x, z}) =
1. Otherwise, p(y, {y, z}) = 1. In that case, p(x, {x, z}) = 1 follows from the transitivity of B .
(B) By construction, B is unique. Since p satisfies SPR, LD is necessary and sufficient for the uniqueness of v;
and it implies that B satisfies the Sorites property.
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Appendix E – Additional Results
Lemma 5. A positive random choice function p satisfies Strong stochastic transitivity if and only if it satisfies IIA.
Proof. Fix a positive random choice function p. Given Luce’s Lemma 3 (which specializes the argument given in Step
3 of Theorem 2 above), it suffices to show that IIA implies SST. Given R ⊂ S ⊆ T and y ∈ S, IIA implies
p(y, T )× p(R,S) = p(y, T )
∑
x∈R








p(x, T ) = p(y, S)× p(R, T ).
Summing this identity over all y ∈ S gives p(S, T )× p(R,S) = p(S, S)× p(R, T ). So, p(R, T ) = p(R,S)× p(S, T ).
Lemma 6. For a random choice function p that satisfies the Luce Choice axiom, p satisfies Strong stochastic transitivity
if and only if it satisfies Luce transitivity.
Proof. Fix a random choice function p that satisfies LCA and LT. It suffices to show that it satisfies SST.
Since p satisfies LCA and LT, it satisfies 4-PR by Lemma 2(a). So, p satisfies SPR by Step 5 in Theorem 2.
Now, suppose min{p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z})} ∈ [1/2, 1] and p(x, {x, z}) < 1. (If p(x, {x, z}) = 1, then there is nothing
to prove.) If max{p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z})} = 1, then p(x, {x, z})} = 1 by LT, which is a contradiction. So, suppose
max{p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z})} < 1. If p(x, {x, z}) = 0, then p(z, {y, z})} = 1 by LT, which is a contradiction. So,






× p(y, {y, z})
p(z, {y, z})
.






× p(y, {y, z})
p(z, {y, z})
≥ p(x, {x, y})
p(y, {x, y})
.
In turn, this implies p(x, {x, z}) ≥ max{p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z})}.
Lemma 7. For a random choice function p that satisfies the Luce Choice axiom and Luce transitivity, p satisfies
Finitely connected domain if and only if it satisfies Linked domain.
Proof. Fix a random choice function p that satisfies LCA, LT, and LD. It suffices to show that it satisfies FCD.
Since p satisfies LCA and LT, it satisfies WC by Lemma 4(a). Fix x, y ∈ X such that p(y, {x, y}) = 0. Since
p satisfies LD, x = z1_..._zn = y for some sequence z1, ..., zn ∈ X. If p(zi, {zi, zi+1}) ≥ 1/2 ≥ p(zi+1, {zi+1, zi+2})
for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2, then LT implies zi_zi+2. By deleting zi+1, one obtains a shorter sequence linking x to y.
(The same reasoning applies if p(zi, {zi, zi+1}) ≤ 1/2 ≤ p(zi+1, {zi+1, zi+2}) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 2.) Ultimately, these
deletions leads to a sequence z′1, ..., z
′
m ∈ X such that:
- p(z′i, {z′i, z′i+1}) ≤ 1/2 for all i = 1, ...,m− 1; or
- p(z′i, {z′i, z′i+1}) ≥ 1/2 for all i = 1, ...,m− 1 and p(z′j , {z′j , z′j+1}) > 1/2 for some 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1.
Since p(y, {x, y}) = 0, the first case contradicts WC. So, the second case obtains.
Example 2. Consider the random choice function p on X := {x, y, z, w} with binary choice probabilities given by
p(x, {x, y}) = p(y, {y, z}) = p(z, {z, w}) = 1/2, p(x, {x, z}) = p(y, {y, w}) = 1 and p(x, {x,w}) = 1/3.
These binary choice probabilities are consistent with the Luce Choice axiom. In fact, assuming that p satisfies the Luce
Choice axiom, they pin down p completely. However, p violates the Quadruple Product rule since x_y_z_w_x but
p(x, {x, y})× p(y, {y, z})× p(z, {z, w})× p(w, {w, x})
p(y, {x, y})× p(z, {y, z})× p(w, {z, w})× p(x, {w, x})
= 2 6= 1.
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Online Appendix
(a) Extension of Theorem 3
Theorem 3∗. For a utility function v : X → R and an irreflexive relation  on X:
(1.1)  is an interval order that is weakly based on v if and only if  satisfies P3 and v-consistency.
(1.2)  is an interval order that is based on v if and only if  satisfies P3 and ∗∗ satisfies v-consistency.
(2.1)  is a semi-order that is weakly based on v if and only if  satisfies P3, P4 and v-consistency.
(3.1)  is a weak order that is based on v if and only if  satisfies P5 and v-consistency.
Proof. In each case, necessity is obvious. For sufficiency, define B as in the proof of Lemma 1. Then:
(1.1) Since it satisfies P3,  is an interval order. By Steps 2-5 in the proof of Lemma 1, (B, v) represents .
(1.2) Since  satisfies P3, it is transitive and coarsens ∗∗. Then, by the argument in part (1.1),  is an interval
order represented by (B, v). Since ∗∗ satisfies v-consistency, (B, v) satisfies R1 by Step 6 (in the proof of Lemma 1).
(2.1) Since it satisfies P3 and P4,  is a semi-order. By the argument in part (1.1), (B, v) represents . Since 
is a semi-order, (B, v) satisfies R2 by Step 7 (in the proof of Lemma 1).
(3.1) Since it satisfies P5,  is a weak order. By the argument in part (2.1), (B, v) represents  and satisfies R2.
Then, since  is a semi-order, (B, v) also satisfies R3 (which is tantamount to the transitivity of ∼). Finally, since 
is a weak order,  coincides with ∗∗. Since  satisfies v-consistency, ∗∗ satisfies the same property. So, satisfies R1
by Step 6 (in the proof of Lemma 1).
(b) Extension of Theorem 2
By translating P2-P5 (from Appendix A), one obtains the following conditions, which apply to all x, y, z, w ∈ X:
S2. p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z}) = 1 =⇒ p(x, {x, z}) = 1.45
S3 (Stochastic Ferrers). p(w, {x,w}), p(z, {y, z}) = 0 =⇒ min{p(z, {x, z}), p(w, {y, w})} = 0.
S4 (Stochastic semi-transitivity). p(y, {x, y}), p(z, {y, z}) = 0 =⇒ min{p(w, {x,w}), p(z, {z, w})} = 0.
S5. p(x, {x, y}), p(y, {y, z}) > 0 =⇒ p(x, {x, z}) > 0.46
Theorem 2∗.47 A random choice function p satisfies the Luce Choice axiom and:
(1) S3 if and only if it can be represented by an extended Luce rule (, v) where  an interval order.
(2) S3-S4 if and only if it can be represented by an extended Luce rule (, v) where  is a semi-order.
(3) S5 if and only if it can be represented by an extended Luce rule (, v) where  is a weak order.
Proof. If B is defined as in the proof of Theorem 2, then S3-S5 translate P3-P5. By the argument in Section 4(a) of
the text, S3 strengthens 4-PR when p satisfies LCA. So, Theorem 2 implies (1)-(3).
Remark 4. Parts (2) and (3) provide alternatives to Theorems B and C from Appendix A.
45This property also appears as Axiom 7 (Dominance transitivity) in Echenique and Saito.
46This property also appears as Axiom P2 in Fishburn (1978).
47To simplify, I omit the uniqueness properties of the representation (which are the same as Theorem 2).
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(c) Extension of Theorem 1
Define the binary relation B as in (B-Id). Then, the appropriate consistency conditions for the binary relations ∗B
and ∗∗B (defined in Section 3(b) of the text) may be stated as follows:
Strong consistency (SC). For every sequence of imperfect discriminations z1_..._zn:






Moderate consistency (MC). For every sequence of imperfect discriminations z1_..._zn:






Lemma 8. For a random choice function p that satisfies the Luce Choice axiom, the following are equivalent:
(i) p satisfies S3-S4 and Moderate consistency; and
(ii) p satisfies Luce transitivity; and
(iii) p satisfies Strong consistency.
Proof. Fix a random choice function p that satisfies LCA.
(i)⇒ (ii) First observe the following. Since p satisfies LCA and S3, p satisfies 4-PR by the argument in Section
4(a) of the text. So, p satisfies SPR by Step 5 in the proof of Theorem 2. Next, suppose p(x, {x, y}) = 1 and
p(y, {y, z}) ∈ [1/2, 1]. (The case where p(x, {x, y}) ∈ [1/2, 1] and p(y, {y, z}) = 1 is similar.) By S2, p(x, {x, z}) > 0. By
way of contradiction, suppose p(x, {x, z}) ∈ (0, 1). Then, z ∼B x B y so that z ∗B y.
In fact, z ∗∗B y. If y B z, then x B z by S2, which is a contradiction. If y ∼B w B z for some w ∈ X, then
x B z or w B y by S3, which is a contradiction. If y B w ∼B z for some w ∈ X, then x B z or z B y by S4,
which is a contradiction. Since z ∗∗B y, p(z, {y, z}) > p(y, {y, z}) by MC, which is a contradiction.
(ii)⇒ (iii) As in the proof of Lemma 4, p satisfies 4-PR and SPR. Suppose y is linked to x by a sequence of
imperfect discriminations z1_..._zn and x ∗B y. If x  y, then P(zi, {zi, zi+1})ni=1 < 1 by Lemma 4(a). Otherwise,
p(y, {x, y}) ∈ (0, 1). Since x ∗B y, suppose there exists some w ∈ X such that y ∼B x B w ∼B y. (The case where
x ∼B w B y ∼B x is similar.) Then, p(x, {x, y}) ∈ (1/2, 1). Otherwise, p(y, {x, y}) ∈ [1/2, 1) and p(x, {x,w}) = 1
imply p(y, {y, w}) = 1 by LT, which contradicts p(y, {y, w}) ∈ (0, 1). Since p(x, {x, y}) ∈ (1/2, 1), SPR then implies the
desired inequality P(zi, {zi, zi+1})ni=1 < 1.
(iii)⇒ (i) To show S3, let p(y, {x, y}), p(w, {z, w}) = 0. By way of contradiction, suppose p(x, {x,w}), p(y, {y, z}) ∈
[0, 1). Since p satisfies S2 (by the proof of Theorem 2), p(x, {x,w}), p(y, {y, z}) ∈ (0, 1) and p(x, {x, z}) ∈ (0, 1). So,
x ∗B z ∗B x by definition. Then, p(x, {x, z}) > p(z, {x, z}) > p(x, {x, z}) by SC, which is a contradiction.
To show S4, let p(y, {x, y}), p(z, {y, z}) = 0. By way of contradiction, suppose p(w, {z, w}), p(x, {x,w}) ∈ [0, 1).
Since p satisfies S2, p(w, {z, w}), p(x, {x,w}) ∈ (0, 1). So, y ∗B w ∗B y by definition. Then, p(y, {y, w}) >
p(w, {y, w}) > p(y, {y, w}) by SC, which is a contradiction.
Lemma 9. For a random choice function p that satisfies the Luce Choice axiom:
(a) p satisfies Luce transitivity if it satisfies S5; but (b) the converse need not hold.
Proof. Fix a random choice function p that satisfies LCA.
(a) Since p satisfies LCA and S5, p satisfies 4-PR by the argument in Section 4(a) of the text. So, p satisfies PR
by Step 4 of Theorem 2. Now, suppose p(x, {x, y}) = 1 and p(y, {y, z}) ∈ [1/2, 1]. (The case where p(x, {x, y}) ∈ [1/2, 1]
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and p(y, {y, z}) = 1 is similar.) Then, by S5, p(x, {x, z}) > 0. By way of contradiction, suppose p(x, {x, z}) ∈ (0, 1).
Then, p(y, {x, y}) > 0 by S5, which is a contradiction.
(b) Suppose p on X := {x, y, z} is represented by (, v) such that: y ∼ z  x ∼ y; and 〈v(x), v(y), v(z)〉 = 〈1, 2, 3〉.
Then, p satisfies LT. However, it violates S5 since p(x, {x, y}) = 1/3 and p(y, {y, z}) = 2/5 but p(x, {x, z}) = 0.
Theorem 1∗.48 A random choice function p satisfies the Luce Choice axiom as well as
(0.1) the Quadruple Product rule and Weak consistency if and only if it can be represented by an extended Luce
rule (, v) where  is a pre-order that satisfies v-consistency.
(1.1) S3 and Weak consistency iff it can be represented by (, v) where  is an interval order weakly based on v.
(1.2) S3 and Moderate consistency iff it can be represented by (, v) where  is an interval order based on v.
(2.1) S3-S4 and Weak consistency iff it can be represented by (, v) where  is a semi-order weakly based on v.
(2.2) S3-S4 and Moderate consistency iff it can be represented by (, v) where  is a semi-order based on v.
(2.3) Strong consistency iff it can be represented (, v) where  is a semi-order based on v.
(3.1) S5 iff it can be represented by (, v) where  is a weak order based on v.
Proof. Fix a random choice function p. In each case, necessity is obvious.
For sufficiency, define (B , v) as in the proof of Theorem 1. Then:
(0.1) Since p satisfies WC, it satisfies WST by Lemma 3(a). Then, by Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 1, (B , v)
represents p. To see that B satisfies v-consistency, suppose x B y. Then, by the same kind of reasoning as Step 2 in
the proof of Theorem 1 (when x ∈ Xj and y ∈ Xk for j 6= k), v(x) > v(y).
(1.1) Since p satisfies LCA and S3, it satisfies 4-PR by the argument in Section 4(a); and B satisfies P3. Since
p satisfies WC, it satisfies WST by Lemma 3(a). By the argument in part (0.1), (B , v) represents p. By Theorem
3∗(1.1), it suffices to show that B satisfies v-consistency. To see this, suppose x B y:
- If x ∈ Xj and y ∈ Xk for j 6= k, then v(x) ≥ f(j) ≥ v(z) + 1 > v(y) as in Step 2 (from Theorem 1).
- Otherwise, x, y ∈ Xj . By definition, u(x) := P(wi, Si)ni=1 × f(j) for some sequence of imperfect discriminations
(wi, Si)
n
i=1 linking x to x̂
j ; and v(y) := P(w′i, S′i)mi=1 × f(j) for some sequence (w′i, S′i)mi=1 linking y to x̂j . Since
p(y, {x, y}) = 0, WC implies v(x) = P(wi, Si)ni=1 × f(j) > P(w′i, S′i)mi=1 × f(j) = v(y) as in Step 2 (from Theorem 1).
(1.2) By the argument in part (1.1), (B , v) represents p; and B satisfies P3. If ∗∗B satisfies v-consistency,
then Theorem 3∗(1.2) implies that B is an interval order based on v. To see that ∗∗B satisfies v-consistency, fix
some alternatives x ∗∗B y and suppose x B z ∼B y for some z ∈ X. (The case where x ∼B z B y is similar.)
Then, v(x) > v(y) by the same type of reasoning as Step 2 (in the proof of Theorem 1). The main difference is that
p(y, {x, y}) ∈ [0, 1/2) follows from MC rather than LT. (If p(y, {x, y}) = 1, then p(y, {y, z}) = 1 by Step 1 of Theorem
2, contradicting z ∼B y. Since x ∗∗B y, MC implies p(y, {x, y}) ∈ [1/2, 1). So, p(y, {x, y}) ∈ [0, 1/2) as required.)
(2.1) By the argument in part (1.1), (B , v) represents p; and B satisfies P3 and v-consistency. Since p satisfies
S4, B satisfies P4. Then, by Theorem 3∗(2.1), B is a semi-order weakly based on v.
(2.2-2.3) These statements follow directly from Lemma 8 and Theorem 1.
(3.1) Since p satisfies LCA and S5, it satisfies WC by Lemmas 4(a) and 9(a). Then, by the argument in part (0.1),
(B , v) represents p; and  satisfies v-consistency. Since p satisfies S5, B satisfies P5. Then, by Theorem 3∗(3.1), B
is a weak order based on v.
Remark 5. Parts (2.2) and (2.3) provide alternatives to Theorem 1A.
48To simplify, I omit the uniqueness properties of the representation (which are the same as Theorem 1).
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